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INTroDuCTIoN AND PrelImINArIeS
This is a compendious book on the problem of evil that brings together 
insights from a  broad range of intellectual disciplines (including not 
just philosophy and theology, but also psychology, neuroscience, and 
literature) in a beautiful and powerful way. even if it does not ultimately 
succeed in providing an entirely convincing reply to the problem of 
evil, it is nevertheless a significant and impressive achievement. Stump 
offers nuanced, original, and often brilliant interpretations of central 
biblical narratives about suffering, and she also lays out a comprehensive 
and appealing argument for the conclusion that God’s existence is 
compatible with the nature and extent of human suffering we find in 
our world. The two parts of the book – the exegeses of biblical stories 
and the philosophical argument – are meant to work together and to 
complement each other.
I have learned a great deal by reading this book. Stump has managed 
to write a  book that is both magisterial and humane. The details are 
subtle and the argumentation is sometimes intricate, and one can learn 
much about specific philosophical and theological topics along the way. 
And in the end it adds up to something big: a Thomistic defence of God’s 
existence, based on analytical argumentation (the Dominican approach) 
and the humanizing force of stories (Franciscan knowledge).
There is so much to this book that a reviewer must inevitably select 
just a relatively small portion of it on which to focus, and this is what 
I shall do. What is perhaps not inevitable – and yet I will succumb to 
the temptation – will be a  selection of a  few topics that are of special 
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interest to me. This will leave much of this immense and rich book 
for other commentators and readers to explore. I commend it as both 
a challenging and also a deeply engaging experience.
Stump emphasizes that she seeks to provide a  ‘defence’, rather than 
a  ‘theodicy’. This distinction was introduced by Alvin Plantinga, and 
although it is tolerably clear, a  single, precise characterization of the 
distinction has not emerged in the subsequent literature.1 often a ‘defence’ 
is taken to be an attempt to show that the existence of God (as conceived 
in a  certain way) is not logically incompatible with the suffering that 
exists in our world. but the charge that evil (or evil of the sort we find 
in our world) is logically inconsistent with God’s existence is not often 
pressed these days, and it is perhaps too easy simply to establish the 
logical compatibility of God’s existence and evil (of the sort that we find 
in our world). We would typically want something more than a ‘defence’ 
in this very weak sense; we would want an account in which God and 
also the sort of suffering that we have in the actual world exist, where the 
account meets certain further ‘epistemic requirements’.2 Stump suggests 
such a requirement in the following:
It has to be the case that, for all we know (as distinct from all that we are 
committed to believing), the claims of a defense could be true. It would 
therefore invalidate a  defense if something about what we currently 
know demonstrates that the possible world of the defense is not the 
actual world. (p. 454)
The suggestion here is that the account in which both God and the 
relevant sorts of evil are said to exist must be consistent with what is 
‘known’. Stump makes it clear that she here intends that what is known 
be interpreted as the uncontroversial empirical truths. This still seems to 
me to be a rather weak epistemic requirement. That is, the requirement 
here would simply be that the account be logically compatible with the 
uncontested empirical truths.
A  somewhat stronger requirement is suggested by Van Inwagen. 
Instead of simply requiring that the account be compatible with the 
uncontested empirical truths, Van Inwagen also requires that, given 
theism, we have no (good or strong) reason to think that the account 
1 I am indebted to the very thoughtful and helpful critical notice of Stump’s book by 
William Hasker: ‘light in the Darkness? reflections on eleonore Stump’s Theodicy’, Faith 
and Philosophy, 28 (4) (october 2011), pp. 432-50, esp. pp. 432-5.
2 I am here following Hasker, ‘light in the Darkness?’, p. 434.
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is false.3 In his insightful review of Stump’s book, Hasker offers Van 
Inwagen’s epistemic requirement as a  friendly amendment to Stump, 
and he interprets her as seeking to offer a defence that would meet Van 
Inwagen’s requirement.4 Hasker contends that only a defence that meets 
this more robust epistemic requirement could be part of (or on the way 
to) a theodicy. As Hasker puts it, ‘... if we have that much, then the defense 
is at least a candidate for being a theodicy, a true account of the reasons 
that God is justified in permitting suffering.’5
I pause here to offer a passage from David lewis’s fascinating paper, 
‘evil for Freedom’s Sake?’, in which lewis also suggests that the most 
promising project for a theist is to offer something in between a defence 
(in the weak sense) and a full theodicy:
... Defense is too easy; knowing God’s mind is too hard. I  think the 
topic worth pursuing falls in between, and has no place in Plantinga’s 
scheme of theodicy versus defence. Pace Plantinga, I’ll call that topic 
‘theodicy’, but I  don’t mean the know-it-all theodicy that he wisely 
disowns. rather I  mean tentative theodicy, even speculative theodicy. 
The Christian needn’t hope to end by knowing for sure why God permits 
evil. but he can hope to advance from a predicament of not having a clue 
to a  predicament of indecision between several not-too-unbelievable 
hypotheses (maybe still including the hypothesis: ‘none of the above’).6
Perhaps lewis would agree with Hasker’s proposal that what is wanted 
is a defence that is at least a candidate for a theodicy. In any case lewis 
correctly notes that a defence in Plantinga’s sense seems too weak. We 
can perhaps in a rough and ready way place the views about adequacy 
criteria for defences along a  spectrum as follows. We start with the 
weakest constraint on what would count as an adequate defence and 
proceed to more stringent requirements: Plantinga (logical compatibility 
of God’s existence and evil of the sort in the actual world); Stump (logical 
compatibility of God’s existence and evil of the sort in the actual world, 
given uncontested empirical truths); and Van Inwagen/Hasker (logical 
compatibility of God’s existence and evil of the sort in the actual world, 
3 Peter Van Inwagen, ‘The Problem of evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of 
Silence’, Philosophical Perspectives, 5, Philosophy of Religions (1991), 135-65; the quotation 
is from p. 156, cited by Stump on p. 16.
4 Hasker, ‘light in the Darkness?’, p. 435.
5 Hasker, ‘light in the Darkness?’, p. 435.
6 David lewis, ‘evil for Freedom’s Sake?’, Philosophical Papers, 22 (1993), 149-72; the 
quotation is from p. 151.
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and no reason to think the account false, given theism). The idea behind 
the requirement that there be no reason to think the account false, given 
theism, is that God’s existence should fit with the existence of evil in 
a plausible way. That is, we should not have a good or strong reason to 
think that the story of why God allows the evil in question is false.
oVerVIeW oF STumP’S DeFeNCe
At the risk of great oversimplification, I shall offer a brief summary of the 
philosophical argument that provides the core of the Dominican part of 
Stump’s defence.7 This part of Stump’s defence is heavily influenced by 
St. Thomas Aquinas. She begins by laying out a scale of value presented 
by St. Thomas, according to which the best thing for a human person is 
to have union with God (a personal relationship of love), and the worst 
thing is the absence of such union. Following Paul Draper’s helpful 
summary, we can now regiment the argument as follows; we can think of 
it as applying to an arbitrary human person. (1) God loves the person and 
so desires the relevant kind of union with her – a personal relationship 
of love. (2) Such union is impossible even for God, given that a person 
is not in a state of psychic integration around the good. (3) To achieve 
such integration, the person needs to undergo a process of ‘justification 
and sanctification’, which is a gradual process of harmonizing (with God’s 
help) the person’s global desire for a  will that wills the good with her 
other desires. (4) but – and this is important – the best means available to 
God to promote that process is to cause or allow the individual to suffer.
on Stump’s Thomistic defence, God loves us and this leads him (given 
that we are psychologically constituted as we are and disposed to desire 
and choose certain things) to cause (or allow) us to suffer; so, on this 
picture, human suffering is conceptualized along the lines of ‘tough love’ 
given by a parent who is guided by the best interests of the child. Perhaps it 
would be unfair to characterize God’s role here as like a ‘Tiger mom’, since 
such a parent has a quite expansive view of the sorts of suffering that are 
good for the child. It is fairer to Stump’s project to acknowledge that she 
is onto something deep, resonant, and attractive: an interpretation of our 
7 Here, and elsewhere, I have benefited from the extremely insightful critical notice 
of Stump’s book by Paul Draper, ‘“Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of 
Suffering”, reviewed by Paul Draper’, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Available at: 
<http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24772-wandering-in-darkness-narrative-and-the-problem-
of-suffering/> [accessed: 03/09/2012].
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suffering as countenanced by a powerful and well-meaning parent-like 
figure who is guided by our long-term flourishing. Additionally, Stump’s 
interpretation of The Book of Job suggests that God’s communications 
with Job impart via Franciscan means the message that God is there 
for Job, like a well-meaning (if somewhat absent, or, at least, apparently 
absent) parent. (It must be admitted that, even if God is there in some 
sense for Job, Job is still a bit of a ‘latch-key kid’.) The human need for 
a parent-like figure to look after us is very pervasive and deep, in my view.
I am reminded of a recent conversation with my brother. our parents 
had just called him on the phone, and from all appearances, the call was 
both short and perfunctory. They didn’t really seem to me to be sharing 
much information at all. When I asked my brother what that was about, 
he replied that ever since the day he was diagnosed with a particularly 
nasty form of non-Hodgins’ lymphoma, they had called him every day. 
Since the treatment had been successful and he has done well for four 
years, the calls have become increasingly short; but our parents have 
still called literally every day. At that point I  understood that the call 
had indeed conveyed something deeply important – perhaps as much 
content as can ever be conveyed, although not of the Dominican sort.
my brother, sister, and I are fortunate; we have wonderful and loving 
parents. How even more wonderful it would be if I could believe that 
the whole universe – including, most notably (from my perspective), me 
– were looked after by an all-powerful and all-loving parent-like figure. 
mark ravizza – my philosophical collaborator and friend, who is now 
a Jesuit priest – once told me that he had a deep need to believe that the 
world is looked after by a good and powerful force. I have often wished 
that I  could have precisely this sort of view (answering to the need); 
I have felt that mark and others who can actually believe this (based on 
their way of evaluating the evidence) have a kind of deep consolation 
and comfort that I lack.
In any case, one might wonder about what exactly the relationship is 
between the Dominican part of the defence – the Thomistic defence – 
and the Franciscan part, in Stump’s view. I very much like Paul Draper’s 
suggestion here:
Stump is acutely aware of just how alien (or medieval) the world of the 
defense will seem to her readers, given contemporary secular and even 
religious sensibilities. She recognizes that her views are at risk of being 
dismissed out of hand. To prevent that from happening, she must make an 
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appeal to both hemispheres of our brains, not just to the left hemisphere. 
Thus, the defense itself must have two hemispheres, a left one consisting 
of a description of St. Thomas’s worldview and theodicy, and a right one 
consisting of the biblical narratives. ... In the case of the right hemisphere 
of the defense, what is needed is philosophically motivated literary 
analysis designed to make the defense come alive in a psychologically 
or interpersonally realistic way in the biblical narratives. ... unless the 
stories can show the ‘Franciscan possibility’ of a  world in which God 
and human beings grow closer through suffering, all the philosophical 
argument in the world is unlikely to make Stump’s audience take the 
defense seriously.8
As noted above, Stump is at pains to claim that her project is to provide 
a defence, rather than a theodicy. I also noted above that there is some 
unclarity about what exactly an adequate defence would involve, and even 
some unclarity about what Stump herself is seeking in this respect. I shall 
here simply point to some general concerns I have about the project of 
offering a mere defence, as opposed to a  theodicy, and then reflect in 
a preliminary way on how these concerns bear on Stump’s project.
SPArTAN DeFeNCeS AND THe NATure oF A DeFeNCe
I share David lewis’s worry that a defence doesn’t really give us much 
– and certainly not as much as we – at least many of us – would (or 
should) want. one way to get at this concern is to ask about whether we 
couldn’t have a different, much simpler ‘defence’ that meets the criteria 
of adequacy for a defence laid out by Plantinga, Stump, Van Inwagen, 
and Hasker. We could ask why these simpler strategies don’t already 
give us a defence (of the indicated sort). And if they do, what exactly 
is added by a  more elaborate defence of the sort provided by Stump? 
And in light of the apparent fact that these pared-down models meet 
the relevant adequacy criteria for defences, we can ask whether any 
defence really provides what we should want, as we struggle with the 
relationship between human suffering and God’s existence. Further, if 
these minimalist stories do not constitute defences, then how is it that 
Stump’s story does indeed count as a defence?
So here’s a really spare defence. God has a certain ‘matrix’ he uses to 
apportion happiness in heaven. more specifically, and for some reason 
8 Ibid., p. 6.
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unknown to us, God gives people much more happiness in heaven, or 
perhaps is much more likely to assign persons to heaven, insofar as they 
have suffered unjustly in their lives on earth. As in Sceptical Theism, 
we do not have access to God’s reasons for this feature of his ‘matrix’. We 
might suggest various hypotheses for why God’s matrix is as it is, but 
we just do not have full access to God’s reasons here. of course, we know 
that God has some reason for the relevant feature of the matrix; we just 
don’t know what it is.
I do not see why this very abstract model is not a ‘defence’: here God’s 
existence would seem to be logically compatible with suffering – at least 
I do not see why it would obviously not be. And it would seem that, on 
this model, God’s existence would be compatible with human suffering, 
given uncontested empirical truths; further, God’s existence would be 
logically compatible with human suffering, and there would seem to 
be no good or strong reason to think any aspect of the account false, 
given theism. Insofar as the spare model won’t really help much for most 
people struggling with the relationship between the manifest facts of 
human suffering and the putative existence of God, it seems to me that 
merely providing a defence is too little. That is, the spare model is really 
unsatisfying – and yet it would seem at least arguably to be a defence, 
according to all of the criteria presented above.
Perhaps someone will deny that my spare model does indeed present 
a defence; they will contend that the picture of God it presents is not of 
a morally perfect being. After all, on this story God allows us to suffer 
and then ‘makes it up to us’ in the afterlife. but just because God makes it 
up to us does not show that allowing us to suffer on earth was justified in 
the first place. The only way that this picture would be compatible with 
God’s perfect goodness is if there is some good reason why people have 
to suffer on earth, it might be urged.9 I agree that there are mysteries 
here, but I  am supposing – along the lines of Sceptical Theism – that 
there are indeed good reasons why God allows the suffering of the 
innocent on earth, even if we humans don’t have full access to them. 
of course, various reasons might be proposed. I am simply positing that 
God has such reasons, even though we do not fully grasp them. While 
perhaps it is not obvious that the story I have told is logically coherent 
(and thus a defence), I would also claim that it is not obvious that the 
story is logically incoherent. (I will return to this point below.)
9 I am very grateful to Patrick Todd for this point.
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We could fill in the bare model a  bit, along the lines suggested by 
Alvin Plantinga’s defence. Suppose that there is an angel – with free 
will – who is in charge of implementing God’s will with respect to the 
apportioning of happiness in heaven (or perhaps assigning slots in 
heaven). For some reason inaccessible to us, the angel in charge of such 
matters has decided (of his or her own free will) to apportion much 
more happiness in the afterlife to those who have suffered unjustly in 
their lives on earth. As in Plantinga’s defence, God does not intervene to 
supersede this angel’s free will, which God prizes highly. of course, the 
mechanism of apportionment of happiness in the afterlife is here filled in 
slightly more than in my first proposal, but it is still a very simple, pared-
down defence. Again, I do not see why it doesn’t meet all the adequacy 
criteria for defences. So, for example, this model seems to present a story 
in which God’s existence is logically compatible with human suffering of 
the sort we find in the actual world, and, given theism, there is no reason 
to think that the story is false (or has a false element).
one might worry that the account is not logically consistent, since 
God could intervene to prevent the angel from implementing the 
angel’s preferred ‘function’ inversely relating worldly and post-mortem 
flourishing. one might also worry about why God put this sort of angel 
in charge of these matters in the first place. but if such worries would 
imply that my proposed defence is logically inconsistent, it would also 
presumably show that Alvin Plantinga’s purported defence is similarly 
logically inconsistent. That is, just as one would need a further account of 
why God would allow the angel to implement her preferred function, so 
Plantinga would need an account of why God would allow the relevant 
devils to exercise their free will. The problem with Plantinga’s defence is 
typically not thought to be that it presents a logically inconsistent picture; 
rather, the problem is that it is thought to be too weak. John Perry (through 
the characters in his dialogue on the problem of evil) offers a defence 
that involves specific devils in charge of causing suffering due to specific 
kinds of calamities, such as fires, floods, tornadoes, earthquakes, and so 
forth. The devils freely choose their role, and God values their free will.10 
It seems to me that my proposed defence is logically on a par with those 
10 John Perry, Dialogue on Good, Evil, and the Existence of God (Indianapolis, 
Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co., 1999); reprinted in Perry, bratman, and Fischer, eds., 
Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 5th edition (New York: 
oxford university Press, 2010), pp. 96-119.
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of Plantinga and Perry; if mine is no defence, then the same fate would 
await the defences presented by Plantinga and Perry.
I pointed out above that one might worry that the spare story with 
which I  began is logically inconsistent insofar as God is supposed to 
be morally perfect and thus would not be inclined to adopt the sort of 
matrix I  suggested. Similarly, one might worry that God is supposed 
to be omnipotent and thus could adopt whatever matrix he wished or 
supersede any angel’s freedom of the will in this matter. but I  would 
observe that one could equally worry whether Stump’s defence is logically 
consistent. This is because she contends that we are by our nature 
psychically fragmented in such a way as not to admit of union with God 
without the process of justification and sanctification, and further that 
suffering is the best means available (even to God) for achieving the 
desired union. but why did God, being omnipotent, create us with such 
a nature? And why couldn’t an omnipotent God have created us such that 
we didn’t need pain and suffering, or so much of it, to get us ready for 
union with God?11 I claim that, at the very least, my stories are just as 
likely as Stump’s to be consistent. So, for example, I claim that there is 
some reason, even if we do not have access to it, why God’s matrix is as 
it is (in my story). but Stump must similarly contend that there is some 
reason, even if we do not have access to it, why God made us such that 
we need pain in order to be ready to have union with him.
of course, I have only sketched ‘defences’ in the most minimal way. 
but even so, I think we can at least pose the question whether the spare 
models I  have proposed are indeed defences, or core components of 
defences. They seem to be, in the Plantinga, Stump, and Van Inwagen/
Hasker senses of ‘defence’. And if so, isn’t a defence just too little to offer 
to many sincere people struggling with the problem of evil? Further, if 
indeed the spare models are defences, we might ask what Stump’s richer 
and more detailed account adds. Again: Stump emphasizes repeatedly 
that her project is not to offer a  theodicy, but, rather, a defence; but if 
this is the project, aren’t there much simpler, more straightforward 
defences? Clearly, there is nothing that demands that there be just one 
or just a few defences, or just one or a few styles of defence; Stump may 
11 Draper makes this point in his NDPr review, writing, ‘There’s no reason, however, 
why an omnipotent being would need to use suffering as a causal means of giving us that 
power [to allow God to be close or closer]. Such a being could simply directly cause us 
to have it or set up the world in such a way that something more benign than suffering 
works just as well as suffering in producing the crucial power.’
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contend that she is providing a  defence – one among many possible 
kinds of defences. This is obviously perfectly legitimate, but it does raise 
the question (again) of whether simply providing a defence – even a rich 
and elaborate one – really gets one very far (or far enough). If a detailed, 
rich, and elaborate story gets us to the same point as the spare accounts 
sketched above, what exactly is the philosophical payoff of the richer, 
more detailed defence?
one could say that the richer kind of story told by Stump is easier 
to meld with the biblical narratives and thus can have easier or better 
access to the synergism of Franciscan and Dominican elements. but 
I am not sure that this really is the case, as it would seem that we could 
invoke the Franciscan knowledge on behalf of the bare stories, as well 
as the richer account given by Stump. The Franciscan knowledge is 
a way of getting in touch with the deeply resonant idea that God is like 
a very powerful and perfectly benevolent parent looking after us, so that, 
even if it may not appear this way to us, our suffering is ultimately in 
our interest. (of course, the Franciscan knowledge is not reducible to 
this point, but can perhaps be understood as a distinctive and ineffable 
way of gaining access to it.) but if this is very roughly correct, then we 
could invoke Franciscan knowledge on behalf of the spare models as well. 
After all, a perfectly knowledgeable, powerful, and good parent would be 
concerned to maximize our flourishing over our entire existence (and not 
just our earthly existence), and such a God would arguably respect the 
free will of angels and devils, as well as human beings. Indeed, Stump’s 
fascinating discussions of God’s conversations with Satan (in her highly 
original interpretation of Job) indicate that, on her view, God cares about 
all his creatures, including refractory angels and devils; and in any case, it 
seems that he must respect their free will (at least if Plantinga’s and Perry’s 
defences really are defences, and, additionally, for independent reasons).
I am interested to know what Stump would say about these questions. 
I do think she has offered an account that captures important features 
of St. Thomas’s worldview and theodicy, and this in itself is no small 
feat. Further, the richness of the detail of Stump’s picture makes it 
helpful insofar as it can be embedded in a  more complete picture of 
human nature, as well as a specific worldview (both philosophical and 
theological). my main concern, I suppose, is that, in the end, even if it is 
indeed a defence, her more elaborate story is only a defence (in the senses 
of Plantinga, Stump, and Hasker/Van Inwagen).
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Perhaps I  could put my lingering dissatisfaction as follows. The 
Problem of evil is, at its fundamental level, about how to fit God with 
evil. A defence is one way to address this problem: one assumes that God 
exists, and tells a story that purports to explain how God’s existence fits 
with evil (of the nature and extent of evil in the actual world). A defence 
then will be of primary interest to someone who already believes in God, 
or is inclined to, or who thinks that there are strong ‘positive’ reasons 
to believe in God – perhaps one of, or a combination of, the traditional 
arguments for the existence of God. A defence then would be a way of 
‘playing defence’, as it were.
but there is also what is sometimes called, following William rowe, 
the ‘evidential Problem of evil’. Although (as with ‘defence’) there is 
perhaps no settled-upon meaning of ‘evidential Problem of evil’, the 
problem is roughly that, setting aside evidence for the existence of God, 
the nature and extent of evil in our world suggests that it is unlikely or 
implausible that God exists. This is, of course, a very different way of 
raising the problem of how God’s existence and evil fit together; here we 
do not begin by assuming God’s existence and seek to tell a coherent and 
even perhaps plausible story about evil. rather, we bracket arguments 
for the existence of God, and we consider whether the evil of our world 
constitutes evidence that God’s existence is unlikely. As far as I can see, 
none of the defences we have considered, including Stump’s, provides 
any answer to the evidential Problem of evil. of course, this is not to 
say that anyone who addresses the Problem of evil must or even should 
address the evidential Problem. Clearly, there are different parts or 
aspects of the Problem of evil, and correspondently different target 
audiences for a response.
I  myself am not antecedently inclined to accept theism, and I  am 
gripped by the notion that the nature and extent of both human and 
animal suffering in our world renders it unlikely that God exists. (Note 
that, surprisingly, Stump does not address the issue of animal suffering, 
which some might find particularly troubling and difficult to reconcile 
with God’s existence; I am not sure how Stump would extend her model 
to address the problem of animal suffering.)12 Thus, I would be interested 
12 It might seem that Stump must here appeal to something more general that will in 
turn give a further explanation of why God allows humans to suffer, since it is implausible 
that being in a relationship with God is the greatest good for an animal. This explanation 
might then supersede the reasons she has already adduced, so her defence would not 
turn on God’s desiring certain kinds of meaningful relationships with us, but with some 
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in not just a defence, but also a theodicy. And I would be interested in 
a response to the evidential Problem of evil. That is, I would like to see 
a  bit more offence, and not just defence.13 Again: it is not reasonable 
to demand that a  theorist address all of these difficult issues, and this 
does not constitute a  critique of Stump’s substantial and important 
book. rather, I am simply trying to situate her project and to identify 
the source of my lingering sense – difficult perhaps fully to articulate – 
that the story presented by Stump leaves some pressing and distressing 
challenges untouched.14
THeISm SHoulD NoT HANG oN A THreAD
Finally, I  wish to point to what I  take to be a  strike against Stump’s 
Thomistic defence. (of course, I realize that one gets three strikes, at least 
in baseball.) elsewhere, and without securing universal and enthusiastic 
agreement (!), I  have argued that it is a  strike against libertarianism 
that our freedom and moral responsibility ‘hang on a thread’; they are 
held hostage to the possible empirical discovery of the truth of causal 
determinism. I  think our moral responsibility and status as persons 
should not be so tenuous; it should not depend on whether or not 
causal determinism turns out to be true. my view is not that our moral 
responsibility should not depend on any empirical contentions; rather, 
I would argue that our moral responsibility should not depend on this 
sort of empirical thesis about the world.
Additionally, I  believe that a  belief in God should not depend on 
whether causal determinism is true. I don’t think that a belief in God 
should hang on a thread – that it should be held hostage to the theoretical 
physicists in this particular way. So, for example, if a  believer in God 
should awake to the New York Times headline, ‘Causal Determinism is 
True!!!’, I do not think that this should lead him to give up his theism (or 
further fact that explains that as well as why he would allow animals to suffer as they do. 
I am grateful to Justin Coates for this point.
13 Vince lombardi, the former coach of the Green bay Packers, famously said, ‘The 
best defense is a good offense.’ This quotation can be traced back to the military strategist, 
Carl von Clausewitz.
14 A  defence will not be of interest only to someone who already believes in God. 
Suppose, for instance, that someone finds the arguments for the existence of God quite 
persuasive, but the problem of evil keeps her from being a theist (i.e., endorsing God’s 
existence), because she thinks there is no adequate response to the problem of evil. or 
suppose someone thinks theists are just crazy, as it were, given the problem of evil. 
A defence could move this person. I am grateful to Patrick Todd for this point.
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even his subscription to the Times!). Just as it is awkward or dialectically 
infelicitous or just plain uncomfortable to have our moral responsibility 
and personhood hang on a thread in this way, so it would be similarly 
uncomfortable to have one’s theism depend on the deliverances of the 
theoretical physicists (in this specific manner).
And yet, as Stump points out, her Thomistic defence presupposes 
what she calls (using a  term Van Inwagen and I unite in disparaging) 
‘libertarian freedom’. Here what is meant is at least that agents must 
have freedom to do otherwise, because it is manifest that so many 
individuals fail to benefit in the indicated ways (through justification 
and sanctification) from their suffering. If we look at the world and note 
this, how is it not an indictment of God? The answer, according to the 
Thomistic defence proposed by Stump, is that even those individuals who 
do not benefit from their suffering and turn freely to God have the power 
to do so; although they fail to achieve union with God, God has provided 
them the required resources, and they have freely failed to take advantage 
of their opportunity. but it is plausible that if causal determinism were 
true, then no human person would have the freedom to do other than 
he or she actually does. For various reasons, it is plausible to suppose 
that causal determinism must be false, in order for individuals to have 
freedom to do otherwise. Thus, the defence presupposes the falsity of 
causal determinism, along with human freedom to do otherwise. And, on 
this sort of defence, we would apparently have to give up a belief in God, 
if causal determinism were true. belief in God would hang on a thread. 
I take it that this at least counts against Stump’s proposed defence.
I  concede that the issues here are delicate – both in respect of my 
contention that our status as morally responsible agents should not hang 
on a thread and also that a belief in God should not similarly hang on 
a thread. much more would need to be said to make the case for these 
claims. I simply want here to stake out a view to the effect that it is at least 
somewhat unfortunate – a  factor that militates to some extent against 
a defence – that it makes our belief in God hinge on the falsity of causal 
determinism – an empirical doctrine that could, for all we know, turn out 
to be true.15 In my view, it would be nice to have a compatibilist-friendly 
15 A  proponent of theism might insist that causal determinism is necessarily false, 
given the existence of a God who has the power to intervene in the world, and thus the 
doctrine is not an empirical doctrine at all. Note that even if this is so, it would imply that 
a defence that posited a God that sets up the world but cannot intervene subsequently 
would still have the problem of rendering God’s existence dependent on the falsity of 
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defence. This way one would not have to dig in one’s heals and ignore 
the physicists, if they really do some day discover the truth of causal 
determinism, and one would not have to give up one’s belief in  God. 
As Peter Van Inwagen once said in an informal conversation in which 
I suggested this point, ‘Yes, it would be like having a theodicy in your 
breast pocket, which you could pull out if causal determinism were to 
be shown to be true.’ A compatibilist theodicy would in this respect be 
like an insurance policy designed to minimize one’s dialectical risks, as it 
were. right, and I believe that such a defence can indeed be constructed, 
but it is a project for another occasion – one I very much hope to pursue 
in the future. This project will employ the idea – that Stump herself 
accepts – that moral responsibility does not indeed require alternative 
possibilities; additionally, it will employ other compatibilist ingredients, 
as well as features of libertarian theodicies that can be detached from the 
supernumerary libertarianism. 
CoNCluSIoN
As I  wrote above, eleonore Stump’s book is truly a  magisterial 
combination of analytical philosophy and a humane sensibility. Please 
allow me to say that throughout her career Professor Stump has been 
an exemplar of both of these qualities: a rigorous, incisive, and broadly 
knowledgeable analytical philosopher, as well as a warm, supportive, and 
thoughtful friend.16
causal determinism. Further, although I  do not have the space to argue for this view 
here, I do not think that the move in question – positing the necessary falsity of causal 
determinism – really helps with the problem of religious belief hanging on a thread. This 
is because it might be true that causal determination holds in a sequence, assuming that 
God does not intervene. And, I would argue, this would be bad enough, in part because 
the only way to sever the connection between the past and the relevant behaviour would 
be a  via a  direct intervention by God. but these matters demand a  more careful and 
comprehensive treatment.
16 I have benefited greatly from discussions with, and comments by, Justin Coates and 
Philip Swenson. I am particularly grateful to detailed, challenging, and highly insightful 
comments on various drafts by Patrick Todd. Finally, I found the Author-meets-Critics 
Session at the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, meetings in Seattle, 
Washington (uSA) in April, 2012 both congenial and illuminating. on that occasion 
David mcNaughton also offered comments, and eleonore Stump replied to both of us. In 
part to avoid being a moving target, and at the risk of being a ‘piñata grande’, I resist the 
temptation to revise significantly in light of the comments at this session.
